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Abstract: Italian Law 219/2017 has been a major achievement in the path to recog-
nize the primacy of informed consent as a part of a wide-ranging relationship between 
physician and patient (therapeutic alliance). In this context many questions arise from 
neuroscience findings, and two seem to be more significant. The first one is if informed 
consent may be thought as a result of biochemical processes and how it could be there-
fore addressed in both health and legal context. The second question stems from the 
implementation of nudging techniques in public health policies: is nudging an ethical 
mean to reach a higher level of health in our societies? A comprehensive and multi-
disciplinary approach is adopted in order to offer possible answers. The article suggests 
how informed consent may be regarded as a free choice and why to design a choice ar-
chitecture that influences citizens’ behavior is undoubtedly efficient, but policy-makers 
have primarily to place weight on building a relationship of trust with people.
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Therapeutic alliance: respect for autonomy as keystone in doctor-patient 
relationship
In recent years medicine has been characterized not only by enormous advances 
both in clinical and in research field, but also by a radical renovation of doctor-
patient relationship. Historically, roots of the doctor-patient relationship must be 
sought further back in time and namely in the Greek Enlightenment (or Fifth-Cen-
tury Enlightenment). Starting with the Hippocratic Oath, a specific attitude to-
wards the patient emerged, whose hallmark is the ethical principle of beneficence1. 
* PhD in Philosophy of Law at the University of Turin; tullia.penna@unito.it
1 ‘The regimen I adopt shall be for the benefit of my patients according to my ability and 
judgment, and not for their hurt or for wrong. Whatsoever house I enter, there will I go for the 
benefit of the sick’; see Kaba and Sooriakumaran 2007: 58.
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In this regard, physicians have acted over centuries in order to promote welfare 
of their patients, but under the assumption that medical expertise and knowledge 
were unavoidable conditions of a rightful mismatch in the relationship with them. 
Thus, beneficence has become the breeding ground for the ‘doctor-knows-best’ 
model; this means that paternalism may be regarded as hardline beneficence2, simi-
lar to parent-infant relationship in which “the doctor’s role involved acting in the 
patient’s best medical interests, with doctors regarding a ‘good patient’ as one who 
submissively accepted the passive role of the infant”3.
But the paternalistic model has been challenged during the last thirty years with 
critics proposing a more active and autonomous role for patient, and narrowed 
physician dominance. Thereby patient-centeredness has become increasingly com-
monplace in medical care and in bioethical debate4, with the aim of placing thera-
peutic alliance between physicians and patients at the core of their relationship5. 
Given the gap of knowledge, expertise, and competence between the healthcare 
professional and her patient, formerly the asymmetric interaction is unchanged. 
Nevertheless, assuming therapeutic alliance as paradigm entails questioning pa-
tient’s perception of the treatment offered, cognitive components of the choice, 
and agreement over the purposes of the therapy6. Therefore, nowadays alliance 
between doctor and patient is grounded in co-operation, and patient-centered 
care has replaced doctor-dominated relationship thus avoiding that the exercise of 
power misrepresents the decision-making process on either side7.
In this setting, wherein the physician has to bridge the gap between medicine 
and common life, a key role in building therapeutic alliance is played by the le-
gal institution of informed consent. By definition, informed consent “is a process 
by which the treating health care provider discloses appropriate information to a 
competent patient so that the patient may make a voluntary choice to accept or 
refuse treatment”8. For informed consent to be valid is required that the patient is 
competent, adequately informed, and not coerced. Thus, implying not merely be-
neficence as ethical principle for physician’s action, but mainly the respect for au-
tonomy of the patient, that is freedom to choose and behave when no constraints 
by others occur. Consequently, powerful therapeutic alliance is rooted in strong 
process of communication whose aim is to achieve a truly informed consent, by 
preserving and strengthening trust between physician and patient9. 
2 Hellin 2002.
3 Kaba and Sooriakumaran 2007: 59.
4 Mead and Bower 2000.
5 Therapeutic alliance relies on cooperation between clinician and patient, their affec-
tive connection, and agreement on treatment’s aims. A powerful therapeutic alliance yields suc-
cessful treatment outcomes such as reduced symptoms, bettered health status and satisfaction 
with healthcare; see Zambelli Pinto et al. 2012.
6 Roth and Fonagy 1996.
7 Kaba and Sooriakumaran 2007: 65.
8 Cocanour 2017: 993; see also Appelbaum 2007.
9 Cocanour 2017.
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Recently, the decision-making model at the basis of informed consent has been 
turning into a shared one, wherein physician and patient seek to manage informa-
tion. Indeed, the former is committed in translating technical notions in common 
language, and the latter strives in weighing information with overwhelming emotions 
and anxiety. In this respect, Italian Law 219/2017 has been a major achievement in 
the path to recognize the primacy of informed consent as a part of a wide-ranging 
relationship between physician and patient. As stated in article 1-paragraph 2, the 
doctor-patient relationship of care and trust must be promoted and valued, since 
well-grounded in respect for autonomy. Furthermore Law 219/2017 sets communi-
cation time as care time (art. 1, par. 8), thereby pointing out how essential is a trustful 
and truthful disclosure as part of health care. Nevertheless, the Law outlines how the 
distinctive feature of treatment planning should be shared decision-making, whose 
outcomes should be complied by health professionals. Hence, respect for autonomy 
and communication play the leading role in building a powerful therapeutic alliance, 
designed to provide a satisfactory answer to the demand for healthcare.
Do neuroscience findings challenge informed consent?
It has been stressed the relevance of informed consent in therapeutic alliance 
between physician and patient, based ethically and legally on respect for autono-
my, that means health care provider must disclose information in a truthful and 
plain way ensuring patient to develop a voluntary choice to refuse or accept treat-
ment. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that a reflection on freedom of choice 
should be addressed to shed light on the value of informed consent. In particular, 
we refer to the innermost conditions that affect consent, setting aside social, cul-
tural and economic aspects of influence.
Indeed, the astonishing results achieved in cognitive sciences and neurosciences 
in recent decades have led to resurfacing concern over the status of free will, since 
the investigation on cognitive phenomena has become reality. Starting with the first 
neurophysiological trials, headed by Benjamin Libet, on the connection between 
cerebral activity and conscious intentions to move10, neuroscientific research has 
made advancements in leaps and bounds. The most recent findings in the field 
have made feasible for some scientists and philosophers to argue that all facets 
of the human mind could be reduce to the electro-chemical processes occurring 
in brain. There also exists a trend of thought and research which traces origins of 
human behavior in genetics, inasmuch as brain functioning would result from the 
shape that genetics provides to the organ itself11. Consequently, someone suggests 
that relevant mutations could arise not only in our intuitive notions of freedom, 
10 Libetet al. 1983; Libet 2004. It has to be said, however, that severe limitations to Li-
bet’s experiments have been highlighted by some scholars; see Baumeister et al. 2019 (defining 
trial’s setting ‘unrealistic’ and ‘contrived’): 234; Roskies 2019: 68; Magni 2019: 55; Radder and 
Meynen 2013; Seifer 2011; Pockett 2006.
11 Cf. Rose 1995; Magni 2019: 50.
120 tullia penna      TCRS
but even in legal definition of it. Needless to itemize, informed consent would be 
involved in this paradigm shift.
Despite of the considerable amount of available neuroscientific studies, there is 
still no consensus about the feasibility to apply the concept of ‘free will’ both to 
action and volition. Nonetheless, it may be pointed out the consensus reached on 
two conditions by the great majority of authors engaged in the debate. In fact, when 
dealing with freedom of will, authors concur on assuming that the agent should have 
alternative courses of action, and the choice among these courses should be based 
on autonomous and rational resolution12. It is obvious that, if we assume these condi-
tions as essential, consequently we should consider the distinctive framework where-
in human action takes place. It comes down to a venerable metaphysic enigma about 
the structure of our universe or, in other words, to the ancient dilemma between de-
terminism and indeterminism. Are all events, even moral choices, wholly determined 
by previously existing causes? Or, conversely, they randomly occur? Indeed, if the 
world we live in is considered to be determined, freedom is possible only if coupled 
with commitment (theory of compatibilism/soft determinism). Otherwise, or free-
dom of will is an illusion (incompatibilism/hard determinism), or determinism is a 
false metaphysical assumption (libertarianism)13. 
Either way, someone claims that regarding free will, determinism is not the as-
pect to ponder on. I refer to Roskies’ stance on how, even if the dilemma of deter-
minism was solved, this would not settle the question about the existence and the 
value of free will. In fact, if intuitively we are brought to think that human volition 
is free to the extent that the world is not determined or pre-determined, it is rea-
sonable to call into question the value of freedom of will whenever indeterminism 
is assumed. In other words, how can we talk of freedom of will if the events we 
are supposed to trigger, or whose courses are supposed to be determined by ours, 
are perfectly random?14 In this regard, Roskies contends that neuroscience will 
always remain silent in the matter of answering to the question if the universe is 
deterministic or not, but neuroscientists will probably show if brain, instead, is15. 
This means that “at some higher level than the motions and interactions of atoms 
and molecules, low-level indeterminacies wash out and the high-level operation of 
the system can be characterized by laws, so that its future activity can be reliably 
predicted on the basis of its past activity”16. Apart from the ability of neuroscience 
to tell if human beings are or not deterministic systems, Roskies argues that pon-
dering on determinism is anyway the wrong direction which to look at. The author 
claims that regardless to the deterministic nature of universe, moral agents may be 
free or not in their resolutions and that the evaluation of degree of freedom and 
moral responsibility requires factors other than determinism17.
12 De Caro and Lavazza, 2019: XIII.
13 Roskies 2006.
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Setting aside determinism, Roskies sustains that the neurological decision-mak-
ing model provided for movement (decision to move an arm) and choice not in-
cluding values (statement of the presence of a material object) may be applied also 
to complex, propositional and discursive decisions including value (provision or 
denial of informed consent). Although, author suggests that to refine the model, 
more scientific research and imagination for its structure are still needed18. Anyway, 
in this threshold-based activation model, different neuronal populations represent 
consistent deliberations competing with each other. In this outline, agents react in 
accordance to reasons and on account of reasons, notwithstanding how complex 
and propositional they are. In short, the neuronal system weighs pros and cons of 
competing alternatives, by evaluating information on facts and eventual reward. 
This means that nowadays neuroscientific findings are consistent with our intui-
tive notion of freedom of will, and that a more refined threshold-based activation 
model could serve as pattern even for decision making process involving choices 
not neutral with respect to value19.
Given this setting, Roskies disagrees with the view requiring consciousness dur-
ing the whole decision-making process, but she proposes to interpret conscious-
ness in freedom of will as the possibility for agents to access the semantic content 
of the reasons in accordance to which and on account of which they act. Albeit, 
the way this occurs is one of the deepest mysteries of science, since neuroscientists 
nowadays have no clue on what and where to seek mechanisms responsible for the 
representation of the most abstract status of human mind20. Nevertheless, Roskies 
argues that consciousness of the reasons is not enough to reveal consciousness of 
decision-making process (spectator position). Given that the evaluation of pros 
and cons is assumed to be held by neuronal process, even joining the reasons at 
the basis of the decision is not enough. Hence, Roskies claims that conscious-
ness demands commitment or, in other words, self-ascribed reasons understood to 
be consistent with agent’s values. Self-consciousness is therefore needed, insofar 
as the agent should assess the consistency of reasons in relation to her interests, 
projects and history21. Roskies’ stance entails the consideration on how little has 
been explained by neuroscientists about self-representation and self-consciousness 
apart from the bodily one.
Assuming Roskies’ view of consciousness of decision-making process and free-
dom of will may be useful in order to reflect upon worth and validity of informed 
consent. That is, to acknowledge that nowadays neuroscience lacks of sharpness 
and extent of information essential to demonstrate if actually the whole human 
mind could be explained on a par with electro-chemical processes. And, as a 
consequence, that our intuitive notion of freedom of will could not be radically 
shifted. Namely, informed consent as legal institution based on competence, infor-
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findings, but it could not be deconstructed. Considered the threshold-based acti-
vation model, in reference to the decision-making process at the basis of informed 
consent, we might claim that different neuronal populations represent competing 
deliberations such as provision or denial of consent. Thus, the neuronal system 
weighs pros and cons of the choice, by evaluating risks, benefits and side-effects 
of a given treatment. As evidence of consciousness for informed consent, it may 
be reasonably argued that self-ascribed reasons should be consistent with agent’s 
perception of quality of life, future life projects and risk tolerance.
Thereby, the state of the art in neuroscience nowadays is not yet in such a posi-
tion to radically affect our intuitive notion of freedom of will, even when regarded 
as a condition to informed consent. In particular, advancement in cognitive sci-
ence and neuroscience still lack of sharpness to demand a transformation of actual 
legal institution of informed consent. That is especially the case of the Italian legal 
system, which recently welcomed Law 219/2017 as an authentic milestone in the 
acknowledgement of the relevance of self-determination of patient. Doctor-patient 
relationship, as nowadays designed – in accordance with the ethical principle of re-
spect for autonomy and the criterion of patient-centeredness – is the most undeni-
able achievement of contemporary medical science, beyond research and technical 
outcomes. If in the future neuroscientists will demonstrate the reduction of whole 
human mind to biochemical processes, then philosophers, bioethicists and lawyers 
will be asked to address the foundations of many legal institutions and informed 
consent will obviously be one of those.
Dangerous liaisons between nudging techniques and informed consent
Before a patient can provide an authentic consent, she should understand al-
ternative choices, risks, benefits, and side-effects stemming from a treatment. It is 
therefore obvious that doctor-patient relationship retains its asymmetrical nature, 
since most patients need physicians to educate and lead them. Asymmetry includes 
both expertise knowledge and emotional condition, given that patients may ex-
perience anxiety, distress, and fear. Over the centuries these features were simply 
solved (or ignored) by implementing the ethical principle of beneficence and, con-
sequently, physicians paid great attention to promote welfare of their patients, but 
with plain acceptance that medical expertise and knowledge were unavoidable 
conditions of a rightful mismatch in the relationship with them. Thus the ‘doctor-
knows-best’ model, or hardline beneficence, prevailed until late 80s. As mentioned 
above, nowadays doctor-patient relationship is based on patient-centeredness, but, 
given the undeniable imbalance among parties, it may be a worthwhile question 
the one concerning how to improve quality of choice for patients. Moreover, many 
patients are supposed to refrain from the option regarded asbest by their phy-
sician, meanwhile many clinicians concern about their patients make irrational 
healthcare decisions, driven by emotional burden stemmed from illness.
Here I suggest to question the potential role of nudging with regard to informed 
consent. Thaler and Sunstein describe a nudge as “any aspect of the choice ar-
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chitecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a 
mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not 
mandates”22. That is, considering how the context wherein agents make decisions 
(choice architecture) may be designed to influence their behavior or, in this par-
ticular case, to provide consent to the option the physician considers is best23. 
Nudging falls into the category of strategies suggested by libertarian paternalists, 
who claim that is feasible and morally acceptable to influence an agent’s behav-
ior to benefit him without infringing on his autonomy24. “Libertarian paternalists 
see countless opportunity for improving people’s health”25, and creating a specific 
choice architecture for informed consent is definitely one.
According to Thaler and Sunstein, our intuitive notion of freedom of choice 
is biased by a false assumption, that is “almost all people, almost all of the time, 
make choices that are in their best interests or at the very least are better that the 
choices that would be made by someone else”26. This assumption is proven to be 
false insofar as agents are situated in context wherein, they are “inexperienced and 
poorly informed, and in which feedback is slow or infrequent”27. Consequently, it 
is feasible to imagine that agents are most likely to need nudges for choice charac-
terized by complexity, hardship, and infrequency. In parallel, choice architects are 
supposed to take better decisions insofar they are more expert than the agents to 
influence, and agents’ interests or needs can be easily acknowledged28. The authors 
also argue that sometimes nudging is unavoidable and that forms of paternalism 
devoid of coercion do exist29.
These reflections raise a legitimate question: is it feasible and ethically accept-
able to influence patient’s choice by creating a choice architecture designed to pro-
vide consent to the option the physician detect as best? Libertarian paternalists an-
swer positively, since patients are required to make decisions which are complex, 
infrequent, and rich in information previously unknown, whereas physicians are 
supposed to easily identify patients’ needs and interests in the matter. However, 
libertarian paternalism entails low-cost opt-out rights, this meaning that the kind 
of influence exercised on patients must preserve at least, or increase, freedom of 
choice. That is, ‘doctor-knows-best’ model is not consistent with nudging.
In this setting, philosophers have proposed a range of influences to nudge pa-
tients towards providing consent to the physician’s favored option, since many 
physicians staunchly believe they have a moral obligation to foster their patients’ 
22 Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 6.
23 Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Cohen 2013 (a); Cohen 2013 (b); Cohen 2015; Douglas and 
Proudfoot 2013; Munoz et al. 2015.
24 Thaler and Sunstein 2003.
25 Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 159.
26 Ivi: 9.
27 Ibidem.
28 Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 250.
29 Ivi: 10-11.
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health, but they are concerned this obligation reveals in conflict with obtaining a 
genuine informed consent30. Conflicts may arise for many reasons, even though 
physician discloses thoroughly information and she proves to be forthcoming. 
Nonetheless, patient may withhold some information, or she may value things un-
like physician does, or she may even make irrational choice, driven by anxiety, mis-
trust or fear31. Regarding nudging and informed consent, philosophers are split. 
Some philosophers argue that when it concerns to secure informed consent, nudg-
ing is essential32 and unavoidable33, instead others argue that nudging is inconsis-
tent with adequate disclosure, which is assumed to be thorough truth-telling34.
Hence, philosophers have offered a range of influences to nudge patients during 
physicians’ adequate disclosure. Simkulet discusses eight of those influences and 
acknowledges just three as nudges, while arguing that one nudge and the other in-
fluences are wholly deceiving forms of disclosure, a priori incompatible with secur-
ing informed consent. The first nudge is discouraging disclosure, that means order-
ing options in a way patient is influenced to choose the physician’s preferred one 
or, alternatively, annoying patient by providing information rich in technical termi-
nology, data or trivial elements. In so doing, physician hides relevant information 
she does not desire the patient to listen. In this respect, the aim of “nudging is not 
to have the patient understand her options so that the patient can make a reason-
able, informed decision. Rather, the physician nudges because although the patient 
is competent, he does not trust the patient to consent to the option he thinks best, 
and seeks to predictably alter the patient’s behavior through means other than 
giving her reasons”35. The second nudge consists of making recommendations, 
insofar as they are honest. In fact, providing recommendations without nudging is 
almost unfeasible, since in standard medical practice physicians are required to ad-
vise their patients and to recommend best options, avoiding they remain neutral36. 
The third nudge corresponds with offering options, given that patients turn out 
to be influenced by the options they were presented with. Douglas and Proudfoot 
describe a trial wherein physician adds a not valid medical option to the list of the 
valid ones and many patients came to believe it was recommended just because it 
was mentioned37. Therefore, this may be considered as nudging, but it violates the 
truth-telling condition at the basis of adequate disclosure, since a not valid option, 
potentially harmful, is mentioned. As a consequence, it is not consistent with se-
curing valid informed consent.
Simkulet does not regard as nudges other influences proposed by some philoso-
phers, such as narrowing disclosure, refusal of a treatment, projecting optimism, 
30 Simkulet 2019.
31 Ibidem.




36 Douglas and Proudfoot 2013
37 Douglas and Proudfoot 2013.
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physician’s appearance, and framing information. Indeed, narrowing disclosure 
entails deception of patient about her options, a priori hidden by physician, with 
no low-cost opt-out rights for patient. Similarly, physician deceives patient by dis-
honestly refusing a treatment, that is by forbidding a valid option without justified 
medical reasons. Moreover, if during disclosure physician conveys optimism – even 
though nonverbally – when she is actually not optimistic, then this kind of influence 
is incompatible with truth-telling and securing informed consent. As well physi-
cian’s appearance may not be considered nudge, even if wearing scrubs improves 
patient’s trust and thus chances of consent, as Cohen stresses, the doctor “has to 
wear something”38. Lastly, framing information in an honest way may not be regard-
ed as nudge since it is merely a means for physician to explain expected outcomes, 
for instance in order to make patient understands success and failure rates39.
I would definitively advocate Simkulet’s perspective by arguing that nudging is 
not consistent with informed consent, unless we assume that securing informed 
consent does not need truth-telling, that the goal of truth-telling is narrow – that 
is sufficient for the patient to understand what physician says, but not why -, and 
finally that a different notion of truth-telling is offered40. Hence, in contemporary 
notion of doctor-patient relationship, grounded in patient-centeredness, nudging 
towards informed consent is not ethically acceptable. Since nudging, in this set-
ting, can leave room for wariness, mistrust, and lack of confidence. Nonetheless, as 
regards ethical principles, the threat of hard-beneficence resurgence is undeniable. 
That is, the ‘slippery slope’ critique seems adequate when it comes to informed 
consent and to the specific doctor-patient relationship, unavoidably characterized 
by asymmetry. In other words, concerns arise that libertarian paternalism slides 
down into hardline beneficence and paternalism tout-court and thus coercion, 
since no low-cost opt-out rights seem feasible when it concerns informed consent.
Why and how to implement nudging techniques in public health policies
A number of potential implementations of nudging are still feasible in health 
sector. Indeed, even Simkulet argues that nudging may be used in a wide range of 
medical contexts to promote healthy behavior41. In these pages, I argue that nudging 
might be profitably implemented at a public health policy level, setting aside in-
formed consent and the specific therapeutic alliance between physician and patient.
As mentioned above, “Libertarian paternalists see countless opportunity for im-
proving people’s health”42, such as designing public policies to influence citizens’ 
behavior in order to promote, to improve, and to increase their level of health. This 
38 Cohen 2013 (a): 9.
39 Simkulet 2019.
40 Ibidem.
41 E.g. Financial incentives for patients for getting regularly checked, prominent display 
of medical posters or pamphlets etc.; Simkulet 2017.
42 Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 159.
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kind of policies are not supposed to be built and implemented through traditional 
regulatory mechanism, but by crafting an architecture of choice which facilitates 
some behaviors than others and without any compulsion. In fact, the discouraged 
conduct is perfectly legal, even though who performs it is burdened with econom-
ic, psychologic, and social costs43. According to libertarian paternalists, these costs 
stem from what is considered a suboptimal decision due to bounded rationality. 
In this setting, suboptimal decision is such when its outcomes for agent or society 
in general are limited, and therefore nudging may become useful tool to reduce 
the lack of rationality by mildly pushing individuals towards their best interests, 
without denying them the chance of making different choices44. 
Beyond theoretical level, nudging has already made his entrance in public health 
policies and, according to Thaler and Sunstein, this is almost unavoidable. In fact, 
default terms in health regulations do not “come from nature or from the sky”45: 
government cannot be absent when it concerns regulations and public policies’ 
design. This is particularly true if we think of organ donation, gamete donation, 
preventive healthcare, public service advertises, and shocking images on cigarette 
packs. In all these fields sweet persuasion already has an essential role. Let us take 
the example of organ donation and, more specifically, the regulations on consent 
to donate. Most States have legislations providing for ‘explicit consent rule’, that 
means people must be proactive if they want do donate their organs post-mortem. 
In Italy, citizens who intend to donate their organs have a wide range of options. 
They may sign particular forms pre-arranged by local healthcare authorities or by 
register offices. Otherwise, Health Ministry and nonprofit organizations supply 
interested individuals with distinctive cards suitable for the declaration of consent. 
Moreover, to express consent, it is feasible filling in a handwritten document, sup-
plied by the Italian Association for Organ Donation or even on ordinary paper, 
which has to be guarded between personal papers. In short, Italian legislation is 
based on the ‘just-maximize-choices’ model to favor freedom of choice, which is 
standard policy advice. But, Thaler and Sunstein have thoroughly demonstrated 
this is a false assumption, since even in a ‘one-click’ world, where crucial choice 
can be made online, without any waste of time or barrier, the default rule prevails. 
In our example, the default rule consists of not being a donor, since a proactive 
choice is required to provide consent. Without coming to ‘routine removal’ model, 
that means “the State owns rights to body parts of people who are dead or in 
certain hopeless conditions”46, it can be argued that an appropriate nudging tech-
nique to increase donors’ number would consist in ‘mandated choice’ model. This 
model provides for compulsion of choice, by forcing citizens to make a free deci-
sion regarding organ donation, for example when they have to renew their papers, 
as Illinois has required since 200647. 
43 Leone 2016.
44 Tallacchini 2017.
45 Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 241.
46 Thaler and Sunstein: 179.
47 Thaler and Sunstein: 182.
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Nowadays policy makers feed growing attention to nudging in particular for 
healthcare problems resistant to different approaches, such as decisions about vac-
cination. Over the decades mandatory vaccination has proven effective at increas-
ing the number of people vaccinated, even though it entails ethical concerns for 
healthcare professionals and, in the last few years, it has resulted in loud protests 
of anti-vaccination movement. Vaccine hesitancy is rooted in cognitive biases ex-
tremely relevant in the setting of decision-making process. First, ‘omission bias’, 
which leads agent to prefer an omission (potentially harmful) to an act (potentially 
less harmful). Second, ‘ambiguity aversion’ as the attitude to prefer a known risk 
(no treatment) to an unknown one (unclear treatment). Third, ‘present bias’, which 
describes how agent gives greater weight to present costs and benefits than to the 
future ones. Then, optimism plays an essential role, since agents show tendency 
to believe that health problems occur easier to other people than to themselves. 
Lastly, naturalness bias leads agents believe that natural substances are anyhow 
preferable to synthetic options48. In the setting of decisions about influenza vac-
cination “a successful strategy for policy-makers and others hoping to increase vac-
cination rates is to design a “choice architecture”. […] These nudges incentivize 
vaccinations and help better align vaccination intentions with near-term actions”49. 
Questioning if nudges may be implemented to increase vaccination is now, more 
than ever, essential. Indeed, the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection has already raised 
both ethical and legal questions about a hypothetical vaccine compulsoriness.
Given these examples, goals of nudging emerge, namely maximizing rationality 
of individuals by influencing their choices and maximizing welfare in general or 
health in particular. But, these goals in themselves are not sufficient to ethically jus-
tify the implementation of nudging in public health policies and regulations. Here 
I argue, by following in the footsteps of Tallacchini, that to be ethically acceptable, 
nudging must have sharply defined and social admissible purposes. Furthermore, 
nudges must be built with another guiding principle: transparency50. Transparency 
is, to all intents and purposes, the keystone of the implementation of nudging in 
public health policies. This is relevant insofar as public policies should be designed 
taking into account the relationship of trust between citizens and public institu-
tions, especially when it comes to healthcare.
Then, Tallacchini sheds light on which might be a proper place for nudging 
in public health policies and regulations. In particular, if at the basis of public 
policy there is scientific uncertainty, then nudging should be avoided, since when 
it is implemented it entails steering information. Moreover, the author claims the 
relevance of civic and medical education for citizens, in order to create a ‘coopera-
tive right’ to health. Nonetheless, trust between institutions and citizens should 
not be taken for granted, but instead it must be place at core level of an on-going 
48 Dubov and Phung 2015.
49 Dubov and Phung 2015: 2534.
50 Tallacchini 2017. The importance of transparency or ‘publicity principle’ is also high-
lighted by Thaler and Sunstein referring to Rawls’ theory; see Thaler and Sunstein 2009.
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process51. In this respect, a participative based form of the regulatory process is ad-
vocated, insofar as public engagement yields awareness about the implementation 
of sweet persuasion tools. Under these conditions, nudging may effectively play an 
ethically acceptable role in healthcare regulations.
Conclusion
In these pages, I proposed few reflections on interweaving of law and neuro-
science, with particular focusing on informed consent, nudging techniques and 
public health policies. 
Considered how doctor-patient relationship has changed over centuries, we are 
allowed to identify patient-centeredness as the model of the contemporary ‘thera-
peutic alliance’ between physicians and patients. This alliance is grounded in respect 
for autonomy as key ethical principle, and constituting besides the condition of le-
gitimacy of the relation between people (regarded both as citizens and patients), 
healthcare professionals and public institutions. Respect for autonomy provides 
moreover the ethical basis for the legal institution of informed consent, in virtue 
of which healthcare provider must disclose information in a truthful and plain way 
ensuring patient to develop a voluntary choice to refuse or accept treatment. 
Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that a reflection on freedom of choice 
should be addressed to shed light on the value of informed consent. Assumed 
Roskies’ view of consciousness of decision-making process and freedom of will 
might be useful in order to reflect upon worth and validity of informed consent. 
That is, to acknowledge nowadays neuroscience lacks of sharpness and extent of 
information essential to demonstrate if actually the whole human mind could be 
explained on a par with electro-chemical processes. Consequently, our intuitive 
notion of freedom of will could not be radically shifted and, thus, informed con-
sent as legal institution based on competence, information and voluntariness might 
be challenged by the most recent neuroscientific findings, but it could not be de-
constructed.
Maintained informed consent in its contemporary understanding, we might 
wonder if is it feasible and morally acceptable to influence patient’s choice by 
creating a choice architecture designed to provide consent to the option the physi-
cian detects as best. Libertarian paternalists answer positively, since patients are 
required to make decisions which are complex, infrequent, and rich in information 
previously unknown, whereas physicians are supposed to easily identify patients’ 
need and interests in the context. Implementation of nudging techniques towards 
securing informed consent stems from finding that demonstrates many patients 
refrain from the choice that their physician regards as best, meanwhile many phy-
sicians worry that their patients make irrational healthcare choices, undermining 
chances of efficient healthcare. But, in the specific and distinctive context of in-
51 Tallacchini 2017.
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formed consent, concerns arise that libertarian paternalism slides down into hard-
line beneficence and paternalism tout-court and thus coercion, since no low-cost 
opt-out rights seem feasible when it concerns informed consent. 
Anyway, a number of potential implementations of nudging are still feasible 
regarding health. Beyond theoretical level, nudging has already made his entrance 
in public health policies and, according to many philosophers, this is almost un-
avoidable. From organ donation to vaccination, nudging techniques may offer 
a valid opportunity for the future, especially in those healthcare fields that have 
proved resistant to other approaches. To be ethically acceptable, nudging must 
have sharply defined and social admissible purposes. In this setting, nudges must 
be built with transparency as guiding principle, insofar as public policies should 
be always designed on the basis of the relationship of trust between citizens and 
public institutions, but especially when it concerns healthcare. Furthermore, rel-
evance of medical education for citizens has to be strengthened, in order to create 
a ‘cooperative right’ to health and give concrete meaning to ‘therapeutic alliance’ 
founded on informed consent. In this respect, trust between institutions and citi-
zens must be placed at core level of an on-going process.
In this perspective the interweaving of law and neuroscience, taking into ac-
count informed consent, nudging techniques and public health policies, could 
yield worthwhile outcomes both for individuals and society. This meaning not 
a mere maximization of rational choices and health, but mostly a participative 
process to design choice architecture for public policies and regulations in health 
sector. Thereby, law and neuroscience in health regulations might give rise not to 
dangerous liaisons, but genuine opportunity for the future.
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